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I. 
The primary thesis that I shall undertake to defend is this: All 
functions of the entire brain must be irreversibly lost in order for a 
(neurodevelopmentally mature) human being to be dead. This is, by 
some lights, a remarkable undertaking. Robert M. Veatch, for 
example, finds such an undertaking to be literally incredible, for he 
imagines that, far from defending this thesis, no one really believes 
any such thing. l According to Veatch, the "whole brain definition of 
death" (WBOO) so construed2 as well as related whole-brain 
definitions have sustained irreparable conceptual damage at the hands 
of their critics and, hence, ought to be discarded. aut the death of 
whole-brain definitions of death has been grossly exaggerated. I 
intend to argue that, contrary to appearances, (i) critics of WBOsO, 
including Veatch, o. Alan Shewmon, Michael Lockwood, and John 
H. Sorenson, have not presented an even remotely plausible case 
against their conceptual viability and (ii) the alternative ("higher-
brain-oriented") definitions of death (HBOOsO) advanced by Veatch, 
Shewmon, Lockwood, Sorenson and others are so defectively 
conceived that even ([WBOsO were in conceptual disarray, we would 
have no good reason to adopt any extant higher-brain-oriented 
definition alternative. 
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II. 
The fundamental conception of death delineated in the 
Uniform Determination of Death Act targets "irreversible cessation of 
all functions of the entire brain stem," as a sufficient condition for 
human death.3 What, precisely, does it mean to say that "all functions 
of the entire brain" have ceased irreversibly? Veatch appears 
sympathetic to the idea that brain functions can include the functions 
of certain isolated nests of neurons. Commenting on a quote by 
neurologist James Bemat4, Veatch states that, "The idea that 
functions of certain ' isolated nests of neurons' can remain when an 
individual is declared dead based on whole-brain-oriented criteria 
certainly stretches the plain words of the law that requires, without 
qualification, that all functions of the entire brain must be gone. ,,5 
Is it the case, as Veatch claims, that Bernat has stretched the 
plain words of the Uniform Determination of Death Act? According 
to Veatch, Bernat has introduced some sort of "qualification" that 
unduly restricts the plain words of the law. But has he? Not by my 
lights, for it appears clear to me that functions of isolated nests of 
neurons are not brain functions at all , just as isolated nests of living 
cellls do not (and, in fact, could not) mediate any bodily functions in 
the absence of a living body. 
Veatch is committed to the view that the irreversible cessation 
of all higher brain functions is sufficient for the death of mature 
human beings. Now if Jones is dead then it appears that, according to 
Veatch, what is left (although perhaps in name only6) is Jones' s dead 
body, unless Veatch is committed to a view of death (a view that is 
apparently affirmed by John H. Sorenson 7 in which it is coherent to 
speak of Jones the human being as being dead but of Jones' s body as 
continuing to live.s If this is Veatch' s view then while alive, both 
Jones and his body are alive. But is this what Veatch really means to 
say? Is, for example, Jones' s living body a human organism? If it is 
not, then what sort of organism could it possible be? Its phenotype 
and its genotype are, after all, clearly human. But if it is a human, 
and if it is a human distinct from Jones (call it Jones*), then while 
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alive it appears that Jones was in fact a composite of two humans: 
Jones the human being and Jones·, the human organism. 
In order to avoid the sorts of complications suggested above9, 
let us suppose that what Veatch means is that if Jones dies, so does 
his body, i.e., that there is no living organism called Jones's Body that 
is somehow distinct from Jones. Then, given the differential death 
rates of different tissues after organismic death, we would expect to 
find some living cells amidst all those cells that once (but no longer) 
composed Jones's living body. But these living cells do not subserve 
any bodily functions; for to sub serve a bodily function is to subserve 
some function of a living body. No living body, no bodily functions, 
for dead bodies have no functions to be subserved. 1o 
Similarly, dead brains have no functions to be subserved. 11 
The WBDsD defender will, at this point claim that brains which boast 
only isolated nests of functioning cells are not subserving any brain 
functions at all, for there is no living brain present with any functions 
for these cellular processes to subserve. The burden of proof at this 
point appears to be on Veatch: Just what sorts of brain functions does 
he imagine such nests of neurons to subserve? 
It would be a mistake to insist, without argument, that for a 
brain to be dead all of its parts must be dead. Veatch doesn't 
obviously fall for any such fallacy of decomposition but he skirts 
awfully close to this when criticizing defenders of WBDsD on the 
grounds that they have somehow compromised their position by 
accommodating som.e minimal amount of brain cell life in their 
conceptions of whole brain death. I conclude, therefore, that Veatch 
has failed to demonstrate that either Bernat or any other like-minded 
defender of WBDsD has anything to be ashamed of in holding that 
whole brain death is compatible with the presence of neuroelectrical 
activity generated by isolated nests of living neurons. 
III. 
According to Veatch, a satisfactory HBODD alternative to 
WBDsD would take the following fonn: "[Olne is dead when there is 
irreversible loss of all 'higher' brain functions.,,12 In agreement with 
Lockwood 13 and Sorenson, Veatch considers "consciousness" to be 
an uncontroversial element in this proper subset of brain functions. 
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In order to simplify our discussion, I shall, in what follows, focus 
solely on Veatch's problematic understanding of consciousness as it 
relates to his version of the HBODD. 
Veatch claims that judgments concerning the presence or 
absence of human consciousness can be made with "similar or greater 
levels of accuracy,,14 than judgments concerning the presence or 
absence of brain death. An attempt is made to support this surprising 
claim by invoking the following three bodies of evidence: (1) "The 
literature on the persistent vegetative state repeatedly claims that we 
can know with great accuracy that consciousness is irreversibly 
IOSt.,,15 (2) "The AMA's Councils of Scientific Affairs and Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs have concluded that the diagnosis [of persistent 
vegetative state] can be made with an error rate of less than one in a 
thousand.,,16 (3) "In fact the President's Commission itself said that 
'the Commission was assured that physicians with experience in this 
area can reliably determine that some patients' loss of consciousness 
is permanent. '" 17 
Concerning (1): How precisely can we know this "with great 
accuracy"? Consider, for example, permanent persistent vegetative 
state (PPVS) patients. Given the stipulated permanence of this state, 
the patient who is accurately diagnosed with PPVS will die a PPVS 
patient. And given its purported vegeiative nature, genuine PPVS 
patients will not display any behavioral indices which might signal 
the presence of consciousness. There is, therefore, simply no 
conceptual space in this context for one successfully to detect the 
presence of consciousness. Contra Veatch, the fact of the matter is 
this: If an alleged PPVS patient were conscious, we would seem to 
have no way to detect this. But if this is so, then regardless of what 
the literature "repeatedly claims," we have no good reason to follow 
it on this point. IS 
In point of fact, Veatch's selective canvassing of the 
neurology literature has failed to focus on a critical item in the 
persistent vegetativ.e state (PVS) corpus, viz. the important and 
apparently dissenting (early) views of Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum, 
the neurologists who initially gave PVS its name. 19 According to 
Jennett and Plum, "Initially the EEG [of PVS patients] may be 
isoelectric, but considerable activity and even alfha rhythm may be 
found once the state has lasted many months.,,2 In fact, it is well 
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known that the EEGs of some PVS patients, especially later in their 
clinical course, are essentially norma1.21 Given these bits of 
neurophysiological data and given the fact that Jennett and Plum are 
alive to the possibility "that a continuum must exist between this 
vegetative state and some of the others described,,22 - most notably 
between PVS and locked-in states in which full-blown consciousness 
awareness coexists with extensive skeletal muscle paralysis - it is 
clearly premature at best to claim with confidence that, with regard to 
PVS patients, "We can know with great accuracy that consciousness 
is irreversibly lost.,,23 
Concerning (2): This is relevant to the present discussion only 
if the proper diagnosis of PVS is incompatible with the presence of 
consciousness in one who has been so properly diagnosed. But as 
noted above, this incompatibility has not been demonstrated, nor is it 
at all clear how it could be demonstrated.24 
The theoretical point at issue bears some further examination. 
There are, on the one hand, particular locked-in patients who 
exemplify full-blown SUbjective awareness; and there are, on the 
other hand, particular PVS patients who experience no phenomenal 
darkness. Now, Veatch (and almost everyone else in this discussion) 
would, it seems, like for us to believe that there are no graded, 
intermediate states. The claim simply put is this: Everyone who 
appears to be unconscious and who appears to be unarousable from 
this apparent state of unconsciousness by ordinary means either is in 
possession of full-bodied conscious awareness (and hence is locked-
in) or is wholly unconscious; the graded levels of consciousness that 
apply to all those individuals who do not appear to be unconscious 
simply do not apply to those individuals who do appear to be 
unconscious. Jennett and Plum had properly resisted this outrageous 
dichotomy, but since the appearance of their seminal paper on PVS 
almost everyone else25 has rushed to embrace it. Why? 
One obvious answer to this question is as follows: To think 
otherwise would be to ensnare clinicians in a web of complexity and 
uncertainty that is repugnant both to those intellects which demand 
simplicity and to the exigencies of smooth clinical practice. Not 
surprisingly, the impetus behind this kind of answer can also be 
traced to Jennett and Plum: "[I]t seems wise to make an absolute 
distinction between patients who do make a consistently 
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understandable response to those around them, whether by word or 
gesture, and those who never do.,,26 Nothing is said in defense ofthis 
principle except that "it seems wise." But wise from what 
standpoint? Surely not from the standpoint of the truth-seeking 
intellect to which Jennett and Plum were so careful earlier to draw to 
our attention; but, rather, from the standpoint of clinical expediency. 
What else is one to do knowing that something must be done, but not 
knowing the nature of those variables essential to sound decision-
making in this context? Jennett and Plum's answer falls far short of 
being a paradigmatic deliverance of practical judgment; rather it is 
unreflective and incautious at best. 
Concerning (3): Of course some physicians can reliably 
detennine that some patients will remain unconscious until their 
deaths (consider, for example, some of those moribund tenninally ill 
patients who, in virtue of some untoward developmental event, 
possess only a myelencephalon). But the real question is whether 
some physicians can reliably detennine whether or not a significant 
number of patients diagnosed as being in persistent vegetative states 
are conscious. 
IV. 
When all is said and done, Veatch is not all that interested in 
assessing the degree to which one can make accurate loss of 
consciousness detenninations, for his most fundamental concern is 
not a practical but a theoretical one, namely, a concern about what it 
is to be dead. As we have noted, his claim is that to be a dead human 
is to suffer the irreversible loss of a certain proper subset of brain 
functions, viz. , higher brain functions. The technological feasibility 
of accurately discerning states of brain death so conceived is 
irrelevant to this theoretical claim. What then is Veatch' s 
justification for the conceptual propriety of adopting this new, 
controversial conception of death? 
The argument -sketch offered by Veatch (as best I can 
reconstruct it) goes something like this: Any conception of human 
death that neglects to take seriously the crucial role played by 
consciousness in human life appears, essentially, to be arbitrary. For 
instance, it appears to be an arbitrary assignment of metaphysical 
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priority in any conception of human death to assign, e.g., mere brain 
stem function such priority over mere spinal cord function. The only 
plausible nonarbitrary delimiter of human death is the presence or 
absence of the capacity for consciousness. And given that death is, in 
some important sense, irreversible, it is the irreversible loss of this 
capacity for consciousness that is the central feature of human death. 
Call this argument-sketch "VAS." 
Veatch attempts to display the plausibility of V AS' 
conclusion by claiming that it is intimately connected with "classical 
Judeo-Christian notions that the human is essentially the integration 
of the mind and the body and that the existence of one without the 
other is not sufficient to constitute a living human being.27 But this is 
a confusion. The dominant classical Christian conception of the soul-
body unit has relied most heavily on Aristotelian-Thomistic 
hylomorphic schemes in which the psyche (or "soul") is thought to be 
the form of the body.28 But clearly, what we mean by the term 
"mind" is not what they meant by the term "soul." According to both 
Aquinas and Aristotle it is possible to be ensouled but not minded. It 
is true that, according to all those adherents of hylomorphism of 
whom I am aware, no living body could exist uninformed and that a 
human body's form, even if it could exist independently of the body, 
would not then, in itself, constitute a living human being. The 
important point here, though, is this: It does not at all follow from 
widely embraced Christian variations on Aristotle ' s hylomorphism 
that being severely brain damaged and, in virtue of this, being 
permanently unconscious (or even irreversibly unconscious, if 
"irreversibility" in this context is indexed merely to the current level 
of technology) until death is incompatible with being rationally 
informed (and, thereby, rationally ensouled). I shall argue for this 
point in greater detail in Part VI. 
v. 
It might appear up to this point that I have rejected the 
HBODD only to have embraced the UDDA' s29 whole-brain 
definition in its stead. This appearance is misleading. I do not, in 
fact, embrace the UDDA's definition of death. Rather, I am, in this 
essay merely defending this conception of death (and variations on it) 
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against some of its most radical and vociferous critics. As noted in 
the opening line of Part II, the unDA identifies death with 
irreversible cessation of all brain functions. If I, on the other hand, 
were to endorse any conception of brain death at all, I would find 
most plausible the thesis that the death of mature human beings is 
intimately tied to the loss of all brain functions. Obviously, I see a 
distinction between the notions of "loss" and "cessation" in this 
context. Prior to discussing this important distinction, I need first to 
say a few words about the notion of irreversibility, for I am also not 
convinced that any reference to the irreversibility of the processes in 
question is an essential constituent in a properly composed definition 
of human death. 
David J. Cole, in his provocative and insightful essay, "The 
Reversibility of Death," eloquently expresses a core intuition 
concerning human death that pace Veatch is shared by, among others, 
Christian theists, viz. that human death it reversible.3D The Christian 
tradition, for example, is essentially grounded in the resurrection of 
Jesus, the exemplar of that victory over death which is the hope of all 
Christian believers. Cole identifies such reversibility with our 
"ordinary" concept of death and, given this alleged commitment, 
avers that this ordinary concept is inconsistent with standard medical 
definitions which entail death's irreversibility. 
Cole points out that the notion of irreversibility is ambiguous 
between what he calls "strong" and "weak" irreversibility, the former 
denoting processes which cannot be reversed and the latter denoting 
processes which are merely not now reversible. He argues that both 
senses of irreversibility as they are presently applied to the notion of 
human death pose insurmountable epistemic and moral problems and, 
hence, ought to be rejected. A protracted discussion of his arguments 
for these conclusions, although tempting, is beyond the scope of this 
essay. 
I do, though, want to examine Cole's proposed charac-
terization of the ordinary concept of death. According to Cole, "A 
being is dead if it both (a) does not currently display essential 
processes and (b) is incapable of resuming them itself in the ordinary 
course of nature conducive to its lifeform. ,,31 Although Cole does not 
provide a perspicuous, satisfying explanation of how to understand 
this characterization, on its most straighforward reading I find Cole's 
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characterization deficient on several counts. I shall mention only 
two: First, Cole's definition of death does not capture what I take to 
be certain features of the ordinary concept of death that Cole appears 
to have overlooked, e.g., that a significant number of ordinary people 
have not died and returned from the dead a number of times. 
Consider an individual who is in asystole (and, hence, who does not 
currently display certain essential, specifically cardiovascular 
processes) and is resuscitated with assistance (e.g., with the help of 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, CPR). Some individuals have been 
thus revived with CPR a number of times and it seems plausible to 
believe that many of these individuals would not have revived 
without this intervention and, hence, are properly characterized as 
being incapable of resuming these essential cardiovascular processes 
themselves. On Cole's conditions, such individuals would have 
actually died a number of times. But this would be anything but an 
ordinary way of understanding what is going on in these situations. 
Second, condition (a) is ambiguous between essential 
processes (whatever precisely those are ) that have merely ceased and 
essential processes that have been destroyed. This distinction can 
adequately be conveyed as follows: Take what appears to be a 
representative essential process, for example, those processes 
governing the functioning of the breathing centers in the brainstem. 
Suppose that person S is cryogenically preserved such that all 
functions of S' s entire brain merely cease. It does not follow from 
this that such a state of hypothesized suspended animation (in which 
no brain processes at all are operative) constitutes a state of death. 
Thus, I along with a small but significant group of thinkers32 have 
come to reject the identification of irreversible cessation of all brain 
functions with the death of developmentally mature human beings, 
opting instead for a conception of human death that requires the 
destruction (or what I earlier called loss) of all functions of the entire 
brain, where such destruction is the end result of processes by which 
the structural substratum (i.e., the matter) that underlies the 
functional unity of the organism disintegrates in virtue of a loss of the 
organism's principle of organization (i.e., its/arm). 
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VI. 
Veatch is not alone in advocating a significant alteration in 
brain death criteria based principally on philosophical con-
siderations. One of the most provocative critics of WBDsD and a 
fellow advocate of a radical redefinition of death similar to Veatch's 
is physician D. Alan Shewmon, M.D. 33 Veatch and Shewmon are 
united in their advocacy for the position that not only PVS patients, 
but also certain advanced Alzheimer's patients are dead. 
Shewmon is slow to ease the demented into the domain of the 
dead. He begins by mounting what he takes to be sound arguments 
for ( i ) why ' his conception of brain death constitutes death of a 
human organism, and ( ii ) why some PVS patients are, in spite of 
initial appearances, actually human cadavers. Only then does he 
address the vital status of the demented. We shall examine each of 
these arguments in turn. 
Shewmon begins by invoking a number of concepts which he 
claims to have borrowed from Aristotle and Aquinas. Specifically, he 
discusses what he understands to be their hylomorphic schemes for 
conceptualizing living organisms. (A thorough discussion concerning 
whether or not Shewmon has done justice to the doctrine of 
hylomorphism is beyond the scope of this paper.) 
Shewmon first asks us to consider a case in which a human 
person's brain and body are dissected apart - spatially disconnected 
one from the other - such that the brain is kept alive artificially in a 
fluid-filled vat (as philosophers are wont to have it) and the body is 
kept alive artificially by way of a sophisticated life support system. 
According to Shewmon, the resulting envatted brain is 
identical with the live person prior to the dissection and the "body" is 
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clearly something more than a mere aggregate of individual 
fibroblasts and other types of cells[.] It possesses a certain degree 
of functional unity at the vegetative level. In other words, it is a 
vegetative organism in its own right, with its own substantial 
form . At the moment of separation from the body (now only the 
brain), this form became actualized from its previous virtuality in 
the spiritual soul, just as in the case of the fibroblast. 
Now this brainless vegetative substance, which looks 
like a human body but is not, is exactly what one is dealing with 
in a case of brain death . The only difference is that, with the 
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latter, the agent which removed the brain was not a surgeon but 
nature. In our macabre laboratory, it is evident that the person 
will die, not when we disconnect the respirator from the 
vegetative human-looking organism, but when we disconnect the 
machines from the floating [en vatted] brain. It should therefore 
be equally evident that, in the natural context, a person will die 
(and his spiritual soul will leave the body) the moment his brain 
dies, irrespective of whether the rest of the body maintains some 
vegetable integrity or not. 34 
But why should we think this? First, it is crucial to point out 
that not only is the "body" being kept alive by artificial means in 
Shewmon's scenario, but the brain also. Thus, it does not appear that 
it is the artificiality of the life-sustaining mechanisms that is guiding 
Shewmon's intuitions here. Shewmon would draw the same 
conclusions, it seems, even if neither body nor brain required 
artificial life support. 
Shewmon's dialectical strategy is curious: He intends to 
defend his position on brain death by invoking an odd methodological 
admixture derived from those philosophical strategies which have 
traditionally been employed by Aristotelean-Thomistic natural 
philosophers on the one hand and Parfitian metaphysicians on the 
other. A pure Aristotelean or Thomist would certainly be suspicious 
of Shewmon's appeal to contemporary Parfitian thought experiments 
(which even Shewmon calls "bizarre,,35) with their accompanying 
(apparent) confidence that imaginability is a reliable guide to 
possibility, a principle which Medieval natural philosophers (along 
with a few contemporary philosophers36) would certainly have 
rejected. At any rate, in spite of this methodological tension, I shall 
next argue that even granting Shewmon's method of hypothetical and 
extraordinary cases, it is not at all obvious that Shewmon's 
conclusions follow. 
Shewmon argues that the artificially sustained living body 
(ASLB) which results from the envatting of S's brain is merely a 
vegetative organism (what Shewmon has called a "brainless 
vegetative substance,,37) with its own substantial form, for "It 
possesses a certain degree of functional unity at the vegetative level. 38 
One can, of course, agree that an ASLB "possesses a certain degree of 
functional unity at the vegetative level," and hence agree that it is a 
living organism but deny that it is merely a vegetative organism.39 
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Might not an ASLB possess a rational soul rather than a mere 
vegetative soul? 
One might advance the following two reasons for answering 
this question in the negative. First, one might think that because an 
ASLB is, as Shewmon describes it, a "brainless vegetable substance," 
it could not possess a rational soul. Although I intend to take up this 
objection in much greater detail elsewhere, I shall here say this much: 
First, contrary to Shewmon's use of terms, an ASLB is not obviously 
brainless - any more than Barney Clark died heartless, or any more 
than one who possesses two prosthetic arms is armless. If the notion 
of a brain is, as it appears to be, primarily a functional notion, then 
any material "thing" that functions as a brain in the biological 
economy of a living organism is a brain.4o But if this is so, and if one 
of the chief functions of the brain is its role in mediating organismic 
unity, then an ASLB is not obviously a brainless vegetable substance. 
Second, it is arguably the case that having a brain as a part is 
not a necessary condition for a live organism's being rationally 
ensouled. Consider, for instance, human zygotes and preembryos. 
Neither of these organisms, we are told, have brains as parts and both 
of these organisms, according to the dominant Christian tradition, are 
ensouled organisms. But if this is so, then Shewmon is simply 
mistaken in thinking that: 
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The notion that the brain is the crucial organ which 
detennines the body's compatibility or incompatibility with the 
human soul is also perfectly consistent with the tradition of the 
Catholic Church regarding the baptism of two-headed infant 
"monsters." For centuries, it has been considered proper to 
administer two baptisms absolutely if the monster had two chests 
and heads. If there were two chests and one head, or one chest 
and two heads, there would be one absolute and one conditional 
baptism. Thus, even long before medical science clarified the 
respective functions of the heart and the brain, the Church had 
manifested its openness to the possibility that the brain alone 
could be the critical organ for detennining the presence or 
absence of a human soul. I f there should be two baptisms, then it 
also follows that death of one of the heads would constitute the 
death of a person, even though the body it was attached to 
remains alive (as his sibling's body). 
The notion of brain death as death of the person is 
therefore perfectly in keeping with the Church's traditional 
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criteria for enumerating souls in the context of bizarre medical 
circumstances.41 
To claim, as Shewmon does, that the brain alone is the crucial 
organ for determining rational ensoulment in the Catholic tradition 
based on her baptismal practices regarding birth defective infants is to 
confuse necessary conditions with conditions that are sufficient. All 
that the aforementioned example could plausibly be interpreted as 
showing is that having a live human brain as a part is a sufficient 
condition for possessing a rational soul, not that it is a necessary 
condition. 
Third, one might argue thus (as van Inwagen appears to 
42) argue : An ASLB could not be a human person because the envatted 
brain which was formerly a part of the ASLB is a human person and 
it is not logically possible for both the ASLB and the envatted brain 
to be distinct persons who are identical with the predissected person, 
for then two distinct persons would be (numerically) identical with a 
single person and that is impossible. 
Here is an alternative way of stating the argument: Suppose 
that Jones at to is composed of a body and brain, that at t\ (where t\ is 
later than to ) Jones' s brain is removed and envatted, and that Jones' s 
body is kept alive using an artificial brain. Where is Jones at t\? The 
absurdity comes in thinking that the very same being who was Jones 
at to is, at t\ two distinct beings, viz. an envatted brain and an ASLB, 
for surely one entity cannot be numerically identical with two entities. 
Surely all of that is right. But why think that this is an 
accurate metaphysical description of the aforementioned dissection? 
Here are what I take to be two other genuine possibilities: 
(i) The result of the dissection results in only one scattered 
person. Jones continues at t\ to be identical with both his brain and 
his body (which are not distinct organisms). His brain and body may 
be biologically disconnected, but they are informed by one and the 
same soul. This suggestion is, as it stands, radically non-Aristotelean 
and non-Thomistic, at least as those positions have been traditionally 
understood, for without an organic unity which governs both Jones's 
body and Jones' s brain, it does not seem that a single hylomorphic 
soul could inform them both (although perhaps a Cartesian soul 
could). 
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(ii)The dissection results in two persons one of which is 
distinct from Jones: Jones, who is now identical with the envatted 
brain and a distinct person, namely, and ASLB that is not merely 
vegetative (and not merely a heap of living and dead unicellular 
organisms), but that is infonned with its own rational soul that is 
distinct from Jones's. Just as it is possible for an human (pre)embryo 
to be rationally ensouled but not presently able to cogitate, so too it 
seems possible that an ASLB, whose integrity is sustained through 
the workings of an artificial brain, is also rationally ensouled, 
although not by the same soul that ensouls Jones, the result being that 
this ASLB is a human being who is distinct from Jones. 
VII. 
Shewmon's argument for the conclusion that PVS patients 
are, in spite of initial appearances, human cadavers infonned with 
vegetative souls depends, in part, on focusing upon that group of 
persistent vegetative patients who do not, and never will, possess a 
conscious mental life.43 Call this set of patients "pennanently 
unconscious PVS" (PUPVS) patients. These patients, according to 
Shewmon, are actually the cadavers of the human persons who they 
once were. But again, his argument for this conclusion is not 
compelling. For neither lacking cerebral hemispheres nor being such 
that one is pennanently unconscious is sufficient for non-personhood 
given a plausible interpretation of, for instance, Aquinas's 
hylomorphism. 
Consider a set of human preembryos which are frozen for 
purposes of experimentation and later are killed. These preembryos, 
prior to their freezing, neither possessed cerebral hemispheres as parts 
nor was there any moment in time at which they were conscious. Yet, 
at least a significant number of Christians, whether they be neo-
Cartesians or Thomists (or something else), appear to have good 
reason for thinking that such live human preembryos are human 
persons. 
One could, of course, reply that there is a serious disanalogy 
here, for it is the case that these preembryos possess at least a natural 
potential to be conscious. It is simply a matter of fact that they are 
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not and will never be conscious, whereas the PUPVS patient lacks 
even this natural potential for consciousness. In fact, this is how 
Shewmon does argue: 
What is necessary for the human soul is not the actual functioning 
of the essential brain structures, but their natural potential for 
functioning. Someone who is asleep is not dead, even though the 
functions of intellect and will are suspended. This is because they 
are only temporarily interrupted; there is no structural damage to 
the neural substrate, rendering the brain intrinsically incapable of 
those functions .... [A] brainless embryo is quite unlike a brainless 
adult, since the substantial form of the embryo makes its 
development always tend toward forming those brain structures 
essential for the operation of the intellect. .. [W]hen the critical 
areas are destroyed in an already formed brain, they cannot be 
regenerated, and the body is thereby rendered permanently 
incompatible with the human essence.44 
But is this so? 
Here we must be very careful for surely if it is the case that 
human persons do survive the alterations that are characteristics of 
PUPVS, then PUPVS patients do possess the potential for 
consciousness because prior to succumbing to PUPVS, they were 
conscious. Consider in this light the following argument: Suppose 
that Jones is a human organism at time to. Next, suppose that (in 
virtue of being rationally ensouled at to) Jones is engaging in 
conscious rational thought at to. Further suppose that at time tl Jones 
lapses into a PUPVS state and that Jones at tl is the same organism as 
Jones at to. If Jones possesses a rational soul, then it is a necessary 
fact about Jones that he possesses a rational soul (since the rational 
soul of a thing constitutes the essence of a thing). Therefore, if Jones 
possesses a rational soul at to it is also the case that Jones possesses a 
rational soul at tl. And if Jones possesses a rational soul, then Jones 
possesses a natural potential to be conscious. Hence, if Jones 
possessed a natural potential to be conscious at to, then Jones 
possesses a natural potential to be conscious at tl' Clearly Jones 
possessed a potential to be conscious at to, for Jones (by supposition) 
was engaging in conscious rational activity at to (such activity being 
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in accord with Jones's rational nature). Therefore, Jones (while in a 
PUPVS state) possesses a natural potential to be conscious at tl. 
I am sensitive to the fact that this argument gives the distinct 
appearance of begging a number of questions. Perhaps it does 
(whatever precisely it means to "beg the question"). In any event, the 
argument does highlight one principal point of contention between 
Shewmon and myself: Shewmon believes that Jones at tl is not the 
same enttty as Jones at to, and I believe that this is false. In light of 
the fundamental nature of our disagreement, I here present a second 
attempt at mounting an argument against Shewmon: Jones was at one 
time a non-brained non-conscious person. Hence, being Jones is 
compatible with being a non-brained non-conscious person. Further, 
Jones who was a non-brained non-conscious person possessed (at that 
time) the natural potentiality for becoming a brained conscious 
person. This would have been true even if Jones were never to have 
become a brained conscious person. But if x has a natural 
potentiality to be y, then it is a necessary truth about x that x has a 
natural potentiality to be y. Hence, if Jones survives the alterations 
that result in a PUPVS condition, then PUPVS-Jones has the natural 
potentiality to be a brained conscious person.45 
Live humans, for example, (unlike rocks) possess the natural 
potentiality for sight, and necessarily so. Even a man who has 
undergone bilateral enucleation, or one who is congenitally blind, has 
this natural potentiality (i.e., even if one does not see after some time 
t or one does not see at all, the natural potential for sight remains). It 
is, I am claiming, a necessary truth about the kinds of things live 
humans are that they have the natural potentiality to see. It is, in 
short, a part of the essence of human beings that they possess just this 
sort of perceptual potency. Along similar lines, rational animals (i.e., 
human beings) possess the potentiality to be wise (even severely 
mentally retarded - or, more to the point, severely demented -
humans possess this natural potentiality) and, in like manner, they 
possess it essentially. 
VIII. 
Shewmon next extends his account to include the severely 
demented Alzheimer's patient, i.e., one who has undergone the 
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destruction of those parts of one's brain which are essential for the 
proper functioning of one's intellect and will. In such cases, 
Shewmon asserts, only the animal soul, which earlier was merely 
virtually present in the spiritually en souled organism, is now there 
present. Just as in the PUPVS case, Shewmon claims that the person 
does not survive this neuroanatomical insult, but only a "humanoid" 
animal: 
Patients at this stage of the illness have sensory 
perception and can move around, but do not speak or show 
any evidence of intellectual understanding of their 
surroundings; their behavior is governed totally by primitive 
impulses. "Dementia" is really an excellent term for this 
state, since it indicates that the mind is no longer there. The 
body has been rendered incompatible with the human 
essence, so a substantial change must have taken place. The 
spiritual soul must have left the body, so that the person is 
now in the next life, while an animal which looks like the 
former person remains on earth.46 
Shewmon has adopted quite a curious stance here. Why does 
he think that the body of a severely demented patient "has been 
rendered incompatible with the human essence"? Does he really 
believe that no in-principle technological advance could possibly 
restore occurrent rationality to a severely demented human being or, 
perhaps, that even God could not inform that sort of a body with a 
rational soul? 
Evidently he at least affirms the former belief, for he later 
argues that cerebral atrophy (a hallmark of certain forms of severe 
dementia) is "intrinsically irreversible; i.e., ... we can ... rule out the 
possible development of some future technique of making the nerve 
cells regrow, or of transplanting nerve cells which will make the 
proper synaptic connections, etc. ,,47 His argument for this position 
depends on the following controversial assumption: The maintenance 
of S' s identity from time t to later time t* requires that S at t* possess 
some of the sa.rne memories and basic personality structures as S at t. 
He adds that these features of one's identity are encoded in the 
patterns of one's neuronal connections and he thinks it impossible for 
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one's personality, for example, to be rewired into one's previously 
atrophied brain. 
But surely it is Shewmon who is begging a critical question 
here, for there is good reason to believe that person S's persisting 
through time has nothing to do with S's personality or S's memory. 
Peter van Inwagen, for example, has forcefully argued that human 
organismic identity is sufficient for human personal identity.48 I find 
his arguments there to be persuasive. Of course, I come to this debate 
with the prior convictions both that human embryos have no memory 
or personality at all, and that there is good reason to believe that they 
are persons and that they persist through time. 
IX. 
I have been arguing both that the arguments against the 
UDDA version of the WBDD put forth by thinkers like Veatch, 
Shewmon, Lockwood, and Sorenson are not successful and that the 
arguments presented in favor of HBODD alternatives likewise miss 
their mark. In light of this double failure and in light of the deeply 
counterintuitive consequences of this theory - e.g., in light of the 
fact that Shewmon's HBODD implies that some nursing home 
residents who are afflicted With Alzheimer's who move and vocalize 
and eat and sleep are actually human cadavers; or in light of the fact 
that, on Shewmon's view, some severely birth defective neonates are, 
contrary to all appearances, the gestational products of stillbirths - I 
recommend that this family of HBODsD of death be rejected. But as 
I've already stated, I do not thereby advocate the UDDA's particular 
conceptualization of whole-brain death. Rather, I have endeavored in 
this essay to accomplish the more modest task of defending such 
whole-brain conceptualizations of brain death against some of their 
most severe and provocative "progressively minded" critics.49 
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